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2006 Nuclear Issues v28 11 |
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Written by SONE
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Wednesday, 01 November 2006 |
Nuclear Issues is also available as a pdf download
Climate change
Public and political concern in the UK over climate
change has been heightened with the apocalyptic forecasts of Sir
Nicholas Stern, a former chief economist at the World Bank, in his
report on the Economics of Climate Change which was published on 30th
October.
The report was commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon
Brown, in July 2005. Based on the present scientific consensus it
estimates the possible consequences of global warming and economic cost.
The overall conclusion is that if nothing is done the world could lose
at least 5 percent of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider
range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of
damage could rise to 20 percent of GDP or more. That equates to a
figure of £3.68 trillion. In contrast, the costs of action – reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change
can, if we act quickly, be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year
at £184bn, a small figure compared to the costs and risks that will be
avoided.
In addition to the economic cost Stern outlines the potential human
suffering from enforced migration, flooding, and loss of life from
disease and starvation if action to prevent global warming is not taken
on a global scale. It is emphasised that this is a global problem that
requires a global response. “Emissions have the same effects from
wherever they arise. This is clearly and unambiguously an international
problem with all the attendant difficulties of generating coherent
action and of avoiding free riding. It is a problem requiring
international cooperation and leadership.” Some of the consequences for
each degree centigrade increase in temperature are given as: l 1oC:
Smaller mountain glaciers disappear in the Andes, threatening water
supply of 50 million people.
More than 300 000 people extra die from increase in climate-related diseases in tropical regions.
- 2oC: Water scarcity increases in southern Africa and the
Mediterranean. Significant decline in food production in Africa, where
malaria affects up to 60 million people. Up to 10 million extra people
affected by coastal flooding each year.
- 3oC: Serious droughts in southern Europe occur once every ten
years. Between 1 and 4 billion people suffer water shortages and a
similar number suffer from floods. Many millions of people at risk of
malnutrition, as agricultural yields at higher latitudes reach peak
output. More than 100 million people are affected by the risk of
coastal flooding.
- 4oC: Sub-Saharan Africa and the southern Mediterranean suffer
between 30 and 50 per cent decrease in availability of water.
Agricultural yields decline by 15-35 per cent in Africa. Crops fail in
entire regions. Up to 80 million extra people are exposed to malaria.
- 5oC: Possible disappearance of the large glaciers of the
Himalayas, affecting the water supply of 25 per cent of population of
China and hundreds of millions more in India. Ocean acidity increases
with threat of total collapse in the global fisheries industry. Sea
levels rise inexorably, inundating vast regions of Asia and about half
of the world’s major cities, including London, New York and Tokyo.
The Government response
Presenting the findings in London, Tony Blair said the 700-page
document was the “most important report on the future” published by his
Government. The consequences for the planet of inaction were “literally
disastrous”. “This disaster is not set to happen in some science
fiction future many years ahead, but in our lifetime,” he said. “We
can’t wait the five years it took to negotiate Kyoto – we simply don’t
have the time.
We accept we have to go further [than Kyoto].” In the Commons, the
Environment Secretary, David Miliband, confirmed that ministers were
drawing up a Climate Change Bill, which would enshrine in law the
Government’s long-term target of reducing carbon emissions by 60 per
cent by 2050. But he declined to go into any detail.
This is however a British report on a British initiative.
Whether other countries accept the premises and conclusions remains to
be seen. Anxiety on this point may explain Stern’s insistence that this
is a global problem requiring a global solution. This country cannot
act on its own.
What can be done?
While it dramatically details the consequences, the report, perhaps
understandably, only deals with generalities when it comes to
considering what might be done. The risks of the worst impacts of
climate change can be substantially reduced if greenhouse gas levels in
the atmosphere can be stabilised between 450 and 550ppm CO2 equivalent
(CO2e). The current level now is 430ppm CO2e, but it is rising at more
than 2ppm each year. Stabilisation in this range would require
emissions to be at least 25% below current levels by 2050, and perhaps
much more. Ultimately, stabilisation – at whatever level – requires
that annual emissions be brought down to more than 80% below current
levels – a near impossible task? Three elements of policy are required
for an effective global response. The first is the pricing of carbon,
implemented through tax, trading or regulation.
Although it may take 10 to 20 years before carbon pricing is universal
and automatically factored into decision making. A price of about
85$/tonne of carbon is suggested as likely. Expanding and linking the
growing number of emissions trading schemes around the world is a
powerful way to promote cost-effective reductions in emissions and to
bring forward action in developing countries.
The second policy proposed is innovation and the deployment of
low-carbon technologies with interventions to support the spread of new
technology through cooperation on development and deployment and
increases in energy R&D. In this the power sector is identified as
the largest single carbon emitter accounting for 24 percent of global
emissions in 2000.
It would need to be at least 60% decarbonised by 2050 for atmospheric concentrations to stabilise at or below 550ppm CO2e.
It is difficult to see what other large scale non-fossil energy source
is now available for security of electrcity supply apart from nuclear
power.
The third action outlined is to remove barriers to energy efficiency –
which ignores the increases in GDP and hence energy demand that usually
follow most increases in the efficiency of enrgy use. In the same vein
Stern suggests that action on climate change could create significant
business opportunities, with new markets in low-carbon energy
technologies and other low-carbon goods and services. These markets
could grow to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars each year, and
employment in these sectors will expand accordingly. In this he accepts
the contentious proposition that it is possible to decouple growth from
energy increase.
A danger is that the required shift to a low-carbon global economy will
take place against the background of an abundant supply of solid fossil
fuels (Stern does not consider how the onset of peak oil will limit the
burning of oil and gas) which are more than enough to take the world to
levels of greenhouse-gas concentrations well beyond 750 ppm CO2e, with
very dangerous consequences. Extensive carbon capture and storage would
allow their continued use without damage to the atmosphere – but
Stern’s presumption that this technology will be demonstrated as
feasible and universally applied has yet to be firmly established, let
alone adopted in coal plants around the world.
Cuts in transport and non-energy emissions, such as those resulting
from deforestation and agriculture, and industrial processes are also
essential. The loss of natural forests around the world contributes
more to global emissions each year (18 percent) than the transport
sector (14 percent). Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective
way to reduce emissions; large scale international pilot programmes to
explore the best ways to do this could get underway very quickly.
A conclusion
“The warning is that stabilisation at 450ppm CO2e is already almost out
of reach, given that we are likely to reach this level within ten years
and that there are real difficulties of making the sharp reductions
required with current and foreseeable technologies. Costs rise
significantly as mitigation efforts become more ambitious or sudden.
Efforts to reduce emissions rapidly are likely to be very costly. An
important corollary is that there is a high price to delay. Delay in
taking action on climate change would make it necessary to accept both
more climate change and, eventually, higher mitigation costs. Weak
action in the next 10-20 years would put stabilisation even at 550 ppm
CO2e beyond reach – and this level is already associated with
significant risks.” As a matter of urgency the Government should take
immediate steps to facilitate or initiate new nuclear construction.
Atoms for Survival
It is plain that the world is now preparing for a major expansion of
nuclear power. Almost all of the 31 countries now operating nuclear
power stations have announced, or are planning, increases in output. In
addition a further 20 countries are now actively considering the
construction of new nuclear stations.
(Italy, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Ireland, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Egypt,
Tunisia, Morocco, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Chile, Venezuela, Nigeria,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, New
Zealand: see http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.htm.
Almost all of these countries are largely dependent on fossil fuels for their electricity supply most of which are imported.
This nuclear renaissance (at a time when the Government has foolishly
sold off BNFL’s nuclear capability – but that is another story) is a
response to the dual threats of climate change, driven by the burning
of fossil fuels, and security of energy supply as awareness grows that
oil and gas are finite resources for which world production is nearing
a peak. Access to these fuels will become a critical problem as energy
demand is set to rise in response to population growth and economic
growth. The International Energy Agency has forecast that, if present
policies continue, world energy demand could increase by 53 percent by
2030, but recognised that nuclear power could make a major contribution
to reducing dependence on imported gas and curbing carbon dioxide
emissions.
If the conclusions of the Stern report on the Economics of Climate
Change that the world could lose between 5 or even 20 percent of global
GDP each year are accepted the growth of nuclear generation must be
seen as an essential contributor to what could be, in the worst case, a
global disaster. In addition nuclear electricity could ease
international tensions over access to the world’s oil reserves at a
time when production peaks while the unsatisfied demand continues to
rise. On both counts the more countries that turn to nuclear power the
world will become a safer place.
This positive view is now being contested. The claim that civil nuclear
power programmes are undertaken primarily to acquire the materials and
ability to produce nuclear weapons has long been a principal argument
of those who seek to halt all nuclear development, but it is now being
taken up by those who believe that a nuclear capability should be
restricted to those countries which can be identified as friends of the
West and allies in the ‘War on Terror’.
These arguments have gained ground following the recent attempt by
North Korea to detonate a nuclear bomb, and the accusations against
Iran that their programme for production of low enriched uranium is
only a cover for development of the technology to produce weapons grade
high enriched uranium.
This case for limiting access to nuclear technology has recently been
put forward in articles in Time “When Outlaws Get the Bomb” (October
23) and more provocatively as “Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear
Age” in The New York Times magazine (October 29th) by Noah Feldman, a
senior fellow at the U.S. Council of Foreign Relations. As his title
makes clear Feldman’s case is that not only Iran, but all of the
“world’s Islamist movements, for whom anti-Americanism remains a
rallying cry and a principle of belief” should be blocked from
developing nuclear technology.... It should be relevant that a
particular candidate is our enemy.” This leads him to conclude that “An
Islamic bomb would not just be the same as the nationalist bomb of a
majority-Muslim state, nor would it be the same as a Christian bomb or
a Jewish one.
But its role in history will depend, ultimately, on the meaning Muslims
give it, and the uses to which they put their faith and their
capabilities.” Since throughout his article Feldman makes no
distinction between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy,
assuming like the Greens that one is just a cover for the other, he
would deny access to nuclear technology to all Islamic states. (As
Muslim governments control about two-thirds of the world’s remaining
conventional oil this is a move that could backfire.) The Times article
also referred to “future nuclear wannabees” singling out Egypt and
Turkey, yet these two countries both dependent on, mainly imported,
fossil fuels for 70 – 80 of electricity generation have a strong case
to develop nuclear power to improve energy security and reduce carbon
emissions.
This polarisation of the world into those who are for us or against us
is based on uncertain and shifting foundations. US-Iran relations have
undergone remarkable reversals in the past fifty years. After a CIA
organised coup in 1953 which deposed Iran’s first democratically
elected president, Mossadeq, Iran, under the Shah’s more dictatorial
regime, was supported with massive aid as a presumed ally against the
Russian threat. It is said that in 1972 Iran was even offered
cooperation on the development of breeder reactors. This all came to an
end with the Islamic revolution of 1979.
India, following its development and testing of a nuclear weapon, was
subjected to restrictions applied through the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
This has now changed and although remaining outside the NPT a recent
agreement with the USA allows India, now seen as a friendly democracy,
to obtain technical assistance, fuel, and equipment for its civil
programme while still maintaining an independent military programme.
Russia too is supplying two 1000 MWe stations at Kudankulum for
completion expected in 2008. Brazil has declared a uranium enrichment
programme; but although developed in secrecy it is accepted that this
was for reasons of “commercial security”. Brazil is (for the moment)
considered a friendly democratic country.
But for how long? What if Brazil were to join those other Latin
American countries now turning against US domination? On the other hand
assertions by Iran that their nuclear programme is solely for civil
purposes are not believed.
In addition to the stand-off over enrichment, technical assistance from
the IAEA to ensure that a small reactor, which the Iranians say is
being built to produce radio isotopes for medicine, meets the IAEA
safety standards has been denied on the suspicion that this reactor
could be used to produce weapons grade plutonium.
These developments and the suggestions of moves to withhold nuclear
cooperation and access to technology from all Muslim countries goes
against the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has already
been undermined by Russia and the US in their nuclear relations with
India a country outside the NPT. This suggests that the division of the
world under the Treaty into Nuclear Weapon and Non-Nuclear Weapon
states has outlived its usefulness. It is now becoming clear that the
Nuclear Weapon States not only have no intention of entering into
negotiations to reduce their nuclear weapons as they are required to do
under NPT but are preparing to update and enhance their nuclear
arsenals while showing a firm determination to prevent any new weapon
states emerging.
Feldman makes this clear “The truth is that we hold on to our nuclear
capability not only as a matter of deterrence but also to maintain our
own global strategic position.” This attitude of dominance provides a
powerful incentive for other states to develop their own nuclear
capability, particularly at a time of growing international insecurity,
and when they see that the promised access to technology under NPT in
return for abstaining from weapons development can be denied on
political grounds.
Dr El Baradi of the IAEA has said that 20-30 more countries – virtual
nuclear weapons states - have the capability to develop nuclear weapons
in a very short time. Does this matter? Have nuclear weapons now
outlived their usefulness? Governments, like their generals, are slow
to recognise change and refight the battles of the last war.
The greater threats we face now is not atomic bombs, the Cold War is
over, but climate change and a slow decline in world oil production.
Why bother?
The observation that electricity generated from wind for the UK in 2005
at 2908 GWh was only 0.7 percent of the total electricity supply of 408
846 GWh and just over one quarter of the electricity imported from
France raises the question of why windpower, as a very minor
contributor to electricity supply, has such a hold over public
perception that it is seen as the renewables answer to electricity
security and global warming. Even the contribution of other renewables,
biofuels, landfill gas, wastes etc to electricity supply is three times
greater than that of wind. What is the point of despoiling even more of
the countryside with intrusive wind farms for so little gain? The
answer could be that the windmills are a visible (too highly visible
for many) demonstration of our virtuous green credentials and as such
have an irresistible appeal, particularly to politicians. The turning
of the blades when the wind blows gives the glow of satisfaction that
comes with the belief that we are tapping into a free energy source.
Although the wind blows freely this is not something for nothing. The
many hidden costs associated with wind power are too often ignored.
Apart from the capital and maintenance costs there are the costs of
integrating the large number of small wind farms, often in remote or
offshore areas, into the national supply. But the major hidden cost
comes with the costs that arise from the variability of wind and the
need to provide backup generation.
It has been argued that this variability is minimised by taking the
country as a whole; periods of calm in one area can be compensated by
windier conditions in another – there will always be some wind blowing
somewhere.
The record of wind generation for the whole of Denmark shows that for
that country this is certainly not the case. Throughout the year 2004
there were frequent hourly variations in wind output from near zero to
100 percent of total Danish electricity demand.
Conditions in the UK are not likely to be much different.
The problems come in accommodating this variable supply into a stable
and secure national system. Every announcement of a new windpower
project is invariably accompanied by the mantra that “this will provide
the electricity for x000 homes”. The words “for some of the time” are
omitted. The matter of from where and how the backup supply will come
is ignored.
Denmark is able to compensate for these continuous variations in wind
power output through its connections to the much larger German and
Scandinavian electricity grids to which excess production, above the
system requirement, can be dumped (at a low or even negative price), or
from which supplies can be drawn at times of high demand and when the
wind output is low (at much higher prices). But it also seems from the
Danish experience as if the magnitude and also perhaps the frequency of
the swings in output are increased, not decreased, when the country as
a whole is compared with individual wind farms.
As an island with only one external connection to France, now used to
import French nuclear electricity, the UK is in a more difficult
position. Variations in supply in this country will have to be
compensated entirely with back-up coal or gas-fired generation on
continuous standby. The capacity on standby must then not only be at
least equal to the total wind capacity but it must be brought into
operation to mirror the unpredictable peaks and troughs of wind output.
This is costly; the coal or gas-fired plant operating at low efficiency
will generate almost as much carbon dioxide as is theoretically saved
by the windpower.
Denmark now leads Europe in its windpower production: between 17-19
percent of Danish electricity is generated by wind. But this is more
than can be accommodated on the system. In 2004 the electricity
statistics show that just over half, 55 percent, of Danish wind output
had to be exported so that the consumption of Danish wind power within
the country was only about 8.5 percent of the total electricity
production.
In 2005 there were 5240 windpower units in Denmark with an installed
capacity of 3135 MW (this number will fall as some of the older and
smaller wind turbines are now being replaced) but this corresponds to 1
wind turbine for every 1000 of population, or 1 turbine in every 3
square miles. A map of wind power sites in Denmark shows that the whole
country is covered. Do we really want to cover the British Isle in the
same way for so little gain, and at such a high cost? |
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Last Updated ( Friday, 19 January 2007 )
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