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2005 Aug, Nuclear Issues v27 08 |
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Written by Nuclear Issues
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Monday, 01 August 2005 |
Nuclear Issues is also available as a pdf download
The green agenda
“Taxpayers face £56bn bill for clean-up of nuclear sites” was the
headline to a report in the Independent on the revised costs for the
decommissioning of the 20 nuclear sites which now come under the
Nuclear Decommissioning Agency. This predictably gave the anti-nuclear
lobby the opportunity to decry the “fantastic costs of the nuclear
industry”. But this figure, from a NDA public consultation document
covers all the ‘legacy sites’. These include the research centres
developed from the 1940’s as a part of the Government nuclear programme
– Harwell, Winfreth, Dounreay - the Calder Hall and Chapel Cross
reactors, the BNFL sites, including Sellafield, and the Magnox nuclear
power stations. It has little relevance for the decommissioning and
waste costs of modern nuclear power programme.
There must also be doubt over how much of the proposed ‘clean up’ will
actually be undertaken, at least in the short term. The final
decommissioning of all nuclear sites only makes sense when all nuclear
power activities have come to an end, when no further stations, fuel
cycle plants etc are to be built. It would assume a withering away of
nuclear power generation as successive stations are closed and nuclear
output in the UK ceases with the final closure of Sizewell B. Can this
really be the Government policy? Faced with predictions of the peaking
of world oil and then gas production within the next twenty years (or
even much sooner); with doubts over the viability of intermittent
renewable energies, and misguided attempts to promote energy
efficiency; and with restrictions on coal burning because of global
warming, the probability that nuclear generation will continue for many
years must be high; the end to the nuclear power age is likely to be
long delayed.
It is then pointless to produce detailed theoretical costings for the
decommissioning of nuclear power station sites to ‘greenfield’ state
when some or even all of these sites will almost certainly be used for
new nuclear power stations to be built adjacent to the decommissioned
stations, and able to make use of some of the existing infrastructure,
grid connections etc.
With a substantial expansion of nuclear power generation now expected
in a number of countries, China, India, Japan, Korea and also the USA,
world demand for uranium will increase. This will make the reprocessing
of spent fuel (>95% unburnt uranium), and the production of mixed
oxide (Pu/U) fuels both necessary and profitable. If Britain is
prepared to continue to lead on reprocessing, the long-term future of
Sellafield should be assured (perhaps as an international facility
under IAEA control); if not reprocessing of spent fuel will be carried
on elsewhere.
The concept of a nuclear clean-up programme was first promoted by the
green campaigners seeking to close down the Sellafield site. When it
was pointed out that this would certainly bring economic ruin to the
West Cumbria area where BNFL is the main employer and directly and
indirectly supports most local economic activity, they came up with the
proposal to turn Sellafield into a ‘centre of excellence’ for nuclear
decommissioning. This policy is now being adopted by a government, more
concerned with closing down rather than expanding our nuclear power
capability.
The NDA might then be seen as little more than a very expensive job
creation scheme for the remaining BNFL employees – once the nuclear
parts of the company, the Westinghouse business, have been sold off.
They therefore have an interest in maximising the total sum they will
spend, and in shortening the timescale over which it will be spent – to
within the next 25 years rather than over the 125 years previously
assumed for Magnox stations and 85 years for the AGR stations. (If only
the coal miners had not protested so violently against the government
mine closures they might have been bought off with the implementation
of a coal mine decommissioning programme, perhaps filling in the
underground workings with spoil from the waste tips and returning the
pit head area to a pristine ‘greenfield’ condition.)
But what is this ‘greenfield’ condition? Does it envisage a complete
radioactive decontamination possibly down to or even below the natural
levels in the area, as well as the removal of all metal, brick and
concrete structures, roads etc? And what use is foreseen for the sites
when this pristine condition has been achieved? The term ‘greenfield’
is borrowed from housing planning policy. But it seems unlikely that a
majority of the sites in more remote areas, such as Trawsfynydd in
rural Wales or Sellafield on the edge of the Lake District could
support major housing developments in the absence of any underlying
economic and social structure.
Development of new industries in such locations seems unlikely. This
leaves only tourism, second homes, sheep farming or duplicated ‘Eden
project’ greenhouse structures as the beneficiaries of the very large
sums of public money now proposed to be spent to obtain a ‘greenfield’
status for sites that could more usefully continue to be used for the
new nuclear facilities we will need.
Mixed signals
The prospects for the present nuclear stations are, at first sight far
from promising, but despite this British Energy, in its recent Annual
Report, (American version), after first reflecting on all the actual
and potential problems it faces, makes an optimistic assessment of the
possibility of extending the operating life of its stations beyond that
previously considered, starting with a further 5 years for Dungeness B.
With nuclear generation at 59.8 TWh for the year to end March 2005,
down from 65 TWh for 2003/4, the performance continues to decline.
(63.8 TWh in 02/03 and 67.6 in 01/02) The newly appointed Chief
Executive, perhaps predictably, ascribes this to insufficient
expenditure on essential maintenance in previous years. But since the
company was then operating at a loss the previous management can hardly
be blamed for not being able to spend much more than the minimum
required to maintain the plant in a safe operating condition. Planned
expenditure on the plant improvement programme for the coming year at
£230- £250 is unchanged. And since BE (in the American version)
continues to show a net operating loss – £347 million for the year
2004/05 – it is difficult to see how they will be able to spend much
more in the future.
Average annual load factor for the nuclear stations was 71% in 2004/05
compared with figures of 77%, 76%, 81%, and 75% for the preceding
years. This average figure however was brought down by major problems
at three of the stations, Dungeness B, Hartlepool and Heysham-1, with
load factors of 67%, 47% and 51% respectively. The figures for the four
other AGRs ranged from 75 to 87%. The Sizewell B pressurised water
reactor also performed well with a load factor of 87.6%.
Hartlepool and Heysham-1 were shut down for an extended period during
the year to comply with NII requirements to inspect boiler closures for
potential damage after corrosion of a number of tendon wires at
Hartlepool had suggested the possibility of similar corrosion affecting
the integrity of boiler closure units. Access to these units, which are
inside the concrete pressure vessel, was difficult, but, after a
limited inspection found no corrosion, the stations were returned to
service in December 2004.
A major problem is the big increase in unplanned losses, up from
between 9 and 10 TWh for the previous three years to 17.3 TWh in
2004/5. Unplanned losses not only reduce the operating performance but
incur an additional financial penalty as BE has to buy-in electricity,
often at a high price, to meet its contracted supply commitments. These
unplanned losses arise from incidents other than major plant failures.
It is then alarming that BE now sees them as indicating “a materiel
deterioration in the condition of our plants over time in part caused
by inadequate investment over recent years which had resulted in an
increase in our maintenance backlog and failure to carry out required
maintenance on a timely basis.
If this were the case it would cast doubt on the feasibility of plans to extend the operating life of the stations.
The Report also warns that there could also be problems with the
graphite moderator. If a significant number of the graphite bricks
develop single or multiple cracks this could lead to the distortion of
the core structure, reducing the operational capacity so that even the
currently assumed station lifetimes may not be achieved. To demonstrate
that the safety of the stations is not compromised by core brick
cracking may require increased levels of, or more frequent, inspections
which could result in prolonged statutory or unplanned outages, or even
a refusal by the NII to permit continued operation of a particular
reactor.
There is also the possibility that engineering faults or safety risks
arising from a design problem that is generic to a particular type of
nuclear plant could result in the closure of all of BE’s AGR stations
ahead of their expected lifetimes.
Another potential point of concern, which is mentioned but not further
commented upon in the Report, is the growing number of AGR fuel
failures. Between 1976 and 2000 the average fuel failure rate was one
per year, but from 2001 to date there have been a further 28 fuel
failures of which seven occurred in this year alone. These failures
could affect both the profitability and safety of operation. The most
significant economic risk is at Dungeness B, where a failure type
exists which has the potential to contaminate the reactor, threatening
continued operation. There is no discussion of whether the problem lies
with BNFL or in the reactors.
But now, and apparently ignoring all the potential problems listed
above, BE is considereing an extemsion of the nominal accounting life
for Dungeness B and Hunterston B by five years. This life increase “is
derived from our judgment of our technical and economic ability to make
a secure safety case at each statutory outage and at any relevant PSR
and to maintain the operability of the station as a whole up to the end
of that life.” Such an assessment is now underway for Dungeness B and a
decision is expected in the autumn. The decision on any life-extension
also depends on BE being able to satisfy the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate that the plants can continue to operate safely, and in any
case the plants are subject to a Periodic Safety Review at intervals of
10 years.
On the perhaps optimistic assumption that similar life extensions for
the remaining AGR stations can be achieved there should be sufficient
time for new nuclear stations to be built and brought into operation as
the older stations close down. Without this it is difficult to see how
the UK electricity supply can be assured. Even if the numerologically
based targets of the renewmable programme are achieved (10% by 2010:
20% by 2020: 50% by 2050!) how the remaining other 80%-90% of
electricity supply is to be generated is not obvious. Burning more coal
would be ruled out on grounds of increasing greenhouse gas emissions,
the present preferred alternative of natural gas will become
increasingly more expensive and supplies could be at risk from growing
international competition should there be an eventual decline in world
production. We should seek to move nearer to the French position and
generate up to 80% of electricity from nuclear power.
But in its report BE also warns that “There can be no assurance that
lifetime extensions will be attainable at any of our AGR power stations
nor that the existing operating lifetimes used in our financial
statements will be capable of being achieved.” It would be useful to
know what (if any) contingency plans the Government has to maintain the
country’s electricity supply if the 20% from BE’s nuclear stations were
prematurely lost.
Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is one of the key features of the Government’s energy
policy. This is in the belief that by using energy more efficiently, in
homes, offices and factories the present increase in total energy
demand will be halted and greenhouse gas emissions reduced. The
Government’s goal set out in the 2003 Energy White Paper is to achieve
a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2020, with half of this
reduction coming from energy efficiency. In addition a recent “energy
efficiency Action Plan” from DEFRA has estimated a potential to reduce
emissions by 60% by 2050.
These claims have been investigated by the Science and Technology
Committee of the House of Lords, which, after taking evidence and
examining witnesses, has now produced a lengthy report. This, while not
seriously questioning the underlying beliefs of the Government policy –
that increasing energy efficiency would reduce energy usage – strongly
criticised the government approach to the problem “At the moment it
simply doesn’t have a coherent policy on energy efficiency. There are
far too many departments, agencies and policies, often pulling in
different directions.”
The report then called for a number of fairly obvious measures to
remedy this situation – reducing duplication of effort, improving
standards, enforcing regulation etc.
Surprisingly the Lords committee also felt the need to make a specific
comment on the “inherent inefficiency of the generating process” when
noting that some 61% of the energy of fuel used in electricity stations
is lost as waste heat. But this is an inevitable consequence of the
laws of thermodynamics and has been common knowledge since electricity
became the preferred energy vector over 100 years ago. The losses in
generation are made up by the greater efficiency of end use.
The Committee also skirted round the vexed question of whether
increasing efficiency of energy use can of itself lead to an increase
in energy consumption. But it was sufficiently impressed by the written
and oral evidence of Dr L Brookes that the opposite is more likely, to
call for a greater effort to investigate the so-called “rebound effect.
As a witness from the Energy Policy division of the Department of the
Environment said “At the moment in the household sector we have energy
efficiency improving at the rate of about one percent per annum but we
have the underlying demand going up at one and a half percent per annum
so the net effect is an increase in energy consumption.” But he then
went on to make the optimistic assumption that “if we can double the
rate of increase in energy efficiency ... energy consumption will then
fall”. The possibility that a doubling of energy efficiency would lead
to an even greater increase in energy consumption is not apparently
considered.
While recognising a ‘rebound effect’ whereby consumers may spend up to
30% (or more?) of the savings of increased efficiency in domestic
heating on additional comfort the DEFRA witness argued that “the
remainder of the savings are more likely to be spent on more general
purchases, not just on energy itself but on other goods and services in
the economy.... where you are largely paying for labour rather than for
energy” to conclude that the rebound effect cannot be 100% “since there
are not many things that are more carbon intensive than energy for
heating homes or lighting or powering machinery.” This argument ignores
a multiplier effect which could lie in the range of 1.5 -10.
Any monetary savings made by a consumer from an energy efficiency gain
will inescapably be fed back into the economy through spending or
investment (unless hidden under the mattress or taken by the Government
and used only for repayment of the national debt) when they will
contribute to continued economic growth with a consequent increase of
energy consumption.
The ‘rebound’ effect could then be several times the original savings
as these are spent to increase the income of the suppliers of the
additional goods and services who in turn will go on to spend or
productively invest their increased income and so on ... leading to an
everexpanding economy.
An increase in the application energy efficient technologies will also
contribute to increasing energy use. The Government Action Plan calls
for the rate of cavity wall insulation of existing buildings to be
increased by a factor of three. This will require an average of 600 000
installations in an industry that has historically never exceeded 300
000 installations in one year. If existing companies expand or new
entrants come in they will take on additional employees whose new
earning power will feed economic growth as they and their families
consume more.
Energy efficiency as a part of general technological advancement can
then be seen as an important contributor to a continued economic
expansion which began when wood was supplanted by the fossil fuels
coal, oil and gas, and now is set to continue with nuclear power as the
only large scale new and carbonfree energy source available.
This concept of a multiplier effect could help to understand how it is
that sharp increases in oil and energy prices have in the past led to
world wide recessions although the energy share of industrial and other
costs is small. The Committee quoted evidence that the average family
spent around £600 per year than on domestic energy – less than on
alcohol, while for most businesses energy costs are typically 0.5-1% of
turnover. On these figures a doubling or tripling of energy cost should
have little impact on the economy. That energy actually has a much
greater leverage has been shown when the two dramatic energy price
surges of 1973-75 and 1979-81 brought about significant reductions in
world economic growth. The world economy is now again under threat as
oil prices move upwards.
The Government drive to increase energy efficiency may actually
increase energy consumption: the opposite effect to that intended, and
further undermine a discredited energy policy.
South Korea 20th reactor
The 20th power reactor to enter full commercial operation in South
Korea is Ulchin-6. It is the last of a string of six 950 MWe reactors
known as the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plants. From a nuclear point
of view they are based on the System 80 design developed by the US
Combustion Engineering which merged its nuclear activities with
Westinghouse and at present is therefore owned by British Nuclear Fuels
plc (BNFL). Four more plants built to a standardized design are ready
to start construction at Shin Kori-1 & 2 and Shin Wolsong-1& 2.
These will have 950 MWe plants based on the Combustion Engineeriing
System 80+ which is one of the designs that has been approved by the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an advanced third generation plant.
South Korea now has 16 pressurized water reactors and four Candu type
heavy water reactors in operation. The total capacity is 16 500 MWe.
Clearly South Korea is now a major player in commercial nuclear power.
Planning for replacement
Unlike Britain, the French are already planning to replace all 58 of
their nuclear plants as they reach retirement age. Electricite de
France has announced its plan to build the advanced European
Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) after 2020 at the rate of about one
1600 MWe unit per year. The utility has selected this option the basis
that nuclear will offer economic performance, stability of costs and
environmental benefits. EDF is planning to start building a lead
station EPR at Flammanville in 2007. The French company Ariva (formerly
Framatome) is already building the first EPR in Finland.
The declaration of a long term nuclear replacement plan by the state
owned utility is preparing the way for partial privatisation which is
due to be introduced in late 2005. By then about 30% of the capital
should be sold.
China moves on slowly
Plans for fast reactor in China are continuing slowly but with a
definite objective of eventually making full use of the energy content
of uranium and also as a possible way of burning actinide waste
material from the spent fuel of light water reactors. A 25 MWe China
Experimental Fast Reactor is being built and is now scheduled to enter
service in 2008. This will be followed by a 600 MWe Prototype Fast
Reactor on which design engineering has started.
This is scheduled for operation in 2020.
Beyond that there is talk of 1000 to 1500 MWe commercial plants but no
work has yet started on these. This can be described as a conventional
fast reactor programme and will make use of plants with sodium
coolants. Safety is considered to be well established for such plants.
At present only a watching brief is being kept on other international
developments such as lead-bismuth coolant.
Japan
The Japan Atomic Energy Commission has reaffirmed the direction for the
country’s nuclear power programme. More than a 30 to 40 % share of
total electricity generation will be supplied by nuclear plants after
2030. The level currently is just about 30%. This will include some
replacement of older plants with the advanced light water reactors
which are already operating in the country.
The policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel will be pursued with the
domestic plant nearing completion at Rokkasho and the recovered
plutonium will be recycled initially in mixed oxide fuel for light
water reactors. The fast reactor development program will continue but
plants are not expected to be introduced commercially until about 2050. |
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Last Updated ( Monday, 10 October 2005 )
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