Sweden sees sense

The Swedish centre-right coalition government has finally reversed the silly phase-out plan for nuclear energy. It was one of the first countries to adopt such a plan and with 2010 as the scheduled date for phase-out it is none too soon that they have seen common sense.

Back in 1980 Swedes voted in a nuclear referendum. In fact all three options on offer included eventual phase out so people did not have much choice. But a majority voted for the least antinuclear option which allowed the completion and operation of 12 reactors. Later the government decided on the 2010 deadline for phase-out and also accepted a law which virtually banned electric utilities from even thinking about new nuclear plants.

There has been repeated political argument about when to start the phase-out and, at considerable expense in compensation, two perfectly good plants with a total capacity of 1200 MWe were prematurely closed down at Barseback in 2004 and 2005. But the utilities showed great enterprise in implementing efficiency upgrades at their nuclear plants which have increased nuclear capacity for the whole country by 1150 MWe. That is roughly the capacity of a new reactor. They have also operated their nuclear plants in an exemplary way and produce around 50 percent of Sweden’s electricity. As much of the rest comes from large hydro power plants the country has a small carbon footprint.

Now the Nuclear Phase-Out Act is to be annulled and the prohibition against thinking of new capacity will be overcome by lifting the Nuclear Activities Act. This means that utilities will be able to plan new construction to replace retiring plants though they will still be limited to the present total of ten reactors.

A paper on ‘A sustainable energy and climate policy for the environment, competitiveness and long-term stability’ still makes extravagant claims for renewables citing a target of 50 percent renewable energy by 2020. This is seen as coming principally hydropower and from new wind generators both on-shore and off-shore. Good luck to them, but at least the door is now open for a sensible nuclear policy.

The new look for Sweden has come from a new centre-right government which came to power in September 2006. It consists of the Moderate Party (97 of the 249 or 26.1% of seats in parliament), the Centre Party (29 or 7.9 % of seats), the Liberal People’s Party (28 or 7.9% of seats), and the Christian Democrats (24 or 6.6% of seats). This took over from the Social Democrats which had been in power for some time in Sweden. It is not clear what they think about the new policy although one feels that they may reluctantly accept it as inevitable. One thing is clear – the public has been shown to be pronuclear in several opinion polls.

One other matter on which we disagree with Swedish nuclear policy is the question of recycle of used nuclear fuel. The Swedish utilities took a strong position against this even before the great nuclear debate. They have done a lot of good research work on the throw away fuel cycle which envisages dumping of spent (used) fuel in a repository which has to be good for thousands of years. Their preference was clearly based on prevailing economic conditions. But that position has turned around recently and is likely to move further in favour of recycle in the future. As we pointed out last month, we cannot afford to ignore the vast energy potential of plutonium and unused uranium and by recycling it as MOX we virtually solve the so called nuclear waste problem. So please, while you have a favourable situation in Sweden, try to re-establish the virtue of reprocessing and recycle.

Political view

The Swedish announced that the ban on construction of new nuclear power stations is to be cancelled is surrounded by politics which is not too bright. The new plan will be formally presented to the Parliament on 17th March. This move has been made possible by a change of heart by the Centre party which previously had been firmly against nuclear power, but as the party leader now says the change is “something we can live with.”

The announcement has reopened the political debate on nuclear power in Sweden. The new policy has been strongly denounced by the leader of the opposition Social Democrat party, a view supported by the Socialist party (Vänsterpartiet) and the Greens (Miljöpartiet). Unless some compromise can be reached it seems that nuclear power is likley to be a major issue in next years general election. Attitudes to nuclear power may then upset the trtaditional party loyalties. The trade unions, particularly those in the metal and paper industries, heavily dependent on electricty supply, would support a nuclear expansion; on the other hand the Social Democrats would hope to attract any dissident members of the Centre party firmly opposed to all things nuclear.

This debate has been dormant following the public referendum of 1980, or more recently, since the enforced closure of the two Barsebäck reactors in 2004 and 2005. Barsebäck however, sited almost directly opposite Copenhagen was somthing of a provocation to antinuclear Denmark, and the ouput lost has been made up by the upgrading of the remaining 10 Swedish reactors And after having to pay a total compensation, said to be up to 12 billion Sw.Kr to Vattenfall, the closure policy has lost much of its allure. (Barsebäck was originally owned by Sydkraft - today EOn. In return for the closure, Sydkraft/EOn were given a share of Ringhals, wholly owned by Vattenfall, for which Vattenfall has then received the compensation)

The immediate and fierce reaction to the government announcement is surprising. The new policy is little more than a small, almost logical, advance on the present situation. Although, following the referendum of 1980 the construction of new stations is banned, the power companies have been allowed to upgrade their 10 existing stations; the increase in power is equivalent to one new station. They may now go a step further and build new stations but possibly with the limitation that they can only be built to replace those being shut down. However since any new reactors are likley to be significantly larger than some of the existing stations there would be some increase in the nuclear generation. On the other hand since the exisiting stations are licensed for operation until 2020-2038 the power companies could well be reluctant to replace them prematurely. In any event no decisions are likley to be taken by these companies before the election given the possibility that the energy policy would be reversed if the Social democrats were returned to power.

The argument in favour of the changed policy is that with the time taken in planning, obtaining consents, and construction, assumed to be some 10 years or more, a start should be made now before the first station is due to close in 2020. Those opposed argue that the loss of nuclear ouptut could be made up by increasing wind power or, more implausibly by wave and solar power, as well as reducing demand through ever incresing efficiency of use.

Both hydropower, already the major electricity source, and wind power are dependent on climatic conditions; wind in the short term – hours or days, and hydropower on the longer term as seasonal changes determine the availability of water. Between 1994 and 2007 the hydro generation has varied between a low in 1996 when it was of 37% (51 085 GWh) of national production, to a high of 52% (78 418 GWh) in 2001. In all years the major part of the balance comes from nuclear power with a high of 50% (75 000 GWh) in 2004 and a low of 38% (54 772 GWh) in 2000.

In 2007 hydro contributed 45%, nuclear 44%, with wind at only 1% of national production, and almost 10% generated from fossil and bio fuels, and biofuels. Thus Sweden with 90% of electricity from carbon-free sources is, with France, an EU and world leader in reducing greenhouse gas emisions. To combat climate change ’carbon-free’ is more significant than ’renewable’. The belief that the half of Swedish electricity that comes from nuclear power could be replaced by wind is unrealistic.

The above figures are only for the generation within Sweden, there are additionally imports and exports of electricity. While the imports are mainly of coal fired eletricity with some windpower from Denmark it is suggested that with an increased nuclear generation Sweden could profit from the export of carbon-free electricity and at the same time assist other EU countries – Germany and Poland – in meeting their carbon emission reduction targets. The debate will be heightened by reports that the Estonian State power comany is considering building a nuclear station on the Baltic coast, opposite Sweden.

 Sites being nominated

The UK government has announced a two month period for the nuclear industry to nominate sites for new nuclear power plants and have published criteria against which the sites will be assessed. This sounds like a bit of progress and it looks like some groups are getting ready with proposals.

RWE, the German company which owns Npower, and the UK subsidiary of another German utility, EOn, are to form a 50:50 joint venture. They are proposing to build at least 6000 MWe of nuclear capacity in the UK.

While no sites have been nominated yet, EOn has an agreement with Siemens in Germany and Areva in France for one 1600 MWe European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) for a site at Oldbury B. At the same time RWE has secured agreements for grid connections to three units of 1200 MWe at a site at Wylfa C. These would be suitable for AP 1000 reactors of Westinghouse design.

At the same time British Energy, now owned by Electricite de France, is talking about four 1600 MWe EPRs, two at Sizewell C and two at Hinkley Point C. There is also a revival of interest in building a new plant at Sellafield where the former BNFL had plans for a plant to replace Calder Hall.

If these projects go ahead sometime soon the UK could be producing 35% of its electricity from nuclear power by 2020 compared with the miserable level of 15% to which it has been allowed to decline. But we need some construction to start very soon if it is not all to be too late.

UAE getting serious

The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) has started detailed discussion with prospective suppliers of nuclear plant for the first of up to 5000 MWe of capacity to be built in the UAE by 2020. Prospective suppliers are said to be GDF Suez – a consortium of Areva and Total in France – which is offering two of its 1600 MWe Eruopean Pressurized Water Reactors (EPRs), Westinghouse offering AP 1000s, and General Electric with Hitachi and Toshiba of Japan who are offering Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR). The UAE has commissioned US safety and planning consultant and should be able to move quickly. A contract with two or three vendors is anticipated in the third quarter of 2009 with a start of construction in 2012 and first power production by 2017.

Electric demand in the UAE is growing at 9% per year and is expected to reach 40 GWe by 2020. The 5000 MWe is seen as the first step in a larger programme of nuclear power.

Low carbon economy

To face the predicted effects of climate change the government has set up the Committee on Climate Change to recommend the level at which the UK’s ‘carbon budgets’ should be set. These budgets, established by the Climate Change Act, will define the maximum level of CO2 and of other greenhouse gases (GHG) which the UK will emit in each 5 year budget period, beginning with 2008-12. Their recommendations, set out in their report of December 2008, are that the UK should reduce its GHG emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. After having been considered by government and by Parliament, these will become the statutory budgets for the UK emissions. (Statutory? What penalties will apply if they are not met in 40 years time? )

The committee chaired by Lord Turner of Ecchinswell includes another seven eminent members, scientists, bankers and economists. In addition to the 38 strong team who drew up the report, it acknowledges the contributions from a further 36 individuals, 20 organisations (including British Energy and EDF Energy, the Carbon Trust and Energy Savings trust) and Government departments, as well as from 1000 ‘stakeholders’ who responded to a call for evidence or took part in workshops and meetings. They agreed that technologies are available, or with appropriate support could be developed, to deliver low-carbon energy; that there are opportunities to increase the efficiency of use; and that lifestyle changes which will not undermine welfare can produce significant cuts in energy consumption then represents a broadly based view. “The challenge is not the technical feasibility of a low-carbon economy but making it happen.”

With such a broad input, the views presented to the committee must have approximated to the widely differing views on renewables and nuclear power held by the general public. The Committee had the difficult task of combining these into a single report. But the committee itself may have been divided so that in almost every case the recommendations made are qualified by an opposing view. The one notable exception is the recognition that “Decarbonisation of the power sector is key to achieving emissions reduction targets.” In 2006, emissions from power stations at 185 Mt CO2 e. made up 28% of the total greenhouse gas emissions, (followed by transport, 23%, industry 19% and residential use 13%). This use of the broader term ‘decarbonisation’ breaks the obsession with renewables as the only response to climate change. But in reviewing the available technologies the divided views emerge.

For windpower there is an optimistic assessment of its potential, suggesting that it could meet 30% of UK generation by 2020 and even more beyond. The inherent intermittency of supply is admitted but it suggests that this can be managed through having adequate back-up capacity available to increase generation at short notice, “Intermittency is therefore an issue of cost rather than security of supply” but this ignores the additional carbon emissions from the back-up fossil fired power stations that would be required for the 70% or more of the time that the wind turbines are not generating. There is instead a wishful reference to possible new energy storage and load balancing technologies. At a later point it asserts that power sector emissions reductions of 40% below 1990 levels are realistically achievable by 2020 if renewable generation can be increased to 30% seemingly ignoring their own emphasis on decarbonised rather than renewable electricity. But then doubts creep in. While it believes that the costs of onshore and offshore wind should be accepted, given the significant emissions reduction potential that these technologies offer, the report suggests that new nuclear plants are justified on economic grounds if the feasible pace of deployment of wind power is less than currently envisaged in the Government’s draft Renewable Energy Strategy, and that nuclear power deployment should be accelerated to fill this gap if concerns about waste storage can be overcome. “A slightly lower level of renewables with some nuclear new build would deliver the same emissions reduction of around 50 MtCO2 in 2020. In either scenario, average carbon intensity would fall by 2020 in line with what is required on the longer term path to full decarbonisation by 2050.”    

Next comes Solar power which is expected to become increasingly cost competitive, particularly in subtropical sunny regions – but not much use here. It is admitted that low yields are likely to keep costs in the UK high. The potential of a Severn Barrage is recognized, but with the hint that it could give rise to (harmful?) environmental impacts (e.g. for biodiversity). Other forms of tidal and wave power are seen as only in the earlier stage of development, but again it is optimistically suggested that they might eventually become cost competitive – particularly for the UK.

Enthusiasm for the use of biomass for power generation is tempered with concerns over biomass production, although there could be a use as aviation fuel where alternative low-carbon sources would not be appropriate.

When it comes to nuclear power the report starts boldly enough: “nuclear power is cost competitive with conventional fossil fuel generation even when decommissioning costs and possible fuel price increases due to increased uranium demand are allowed for.” It lists the main constraints on nuclear deployment as the feasible build rate, seen as limited by the supply of technically competent nuclear specialist engineers and demanding regulatory frameworks. (This is a sad reflection on the willful decline of a country which once claimed to lead the world in commercial nuclear power). There is also no mention of possible delays in obtaining heavy forgings for pressure vessels etc at a time of growing expansion of nuclear capacity worldwide. Turning to the negative side the problems of waste and nuclear proliferation are inevitably referred to, before concluding on a positive note that “if these risks are in principle acceptable – a judgment which is beyond our remit – the Committee believes that the economic case for nuclear power deployment is strong.”    

Finally on carbon capture and sequestration it recognizes that this will always be expensive because of the additional process steps but while believing at one point that it is “technically feasible” admits that its contribution during the first three budget periods – up to 2020, “is likely to be limited given that this technology has not yet been demonstrated at the appropriate scale.”

There is however general agreement on the other measures to reduce emissions. After power generation, the second largest source of greenhouse gas emissions is the transport sector accounting for 23% of the 2006 total. Here electric vehicles are seen as offering dramatic reductions for cars and light vans, given adequate investments in recharging infrastructure and improvements in battery technology. Together with legally binding EU targets for emissions from new cars and vans a decrease of up to 15 MTCO2 could be achieved. gCO2/km in 2020 Statutory requirements for emissions. But with the increase in electricity consumption the benefits will be dependent on an increasing decarbonisation of electricity generation.

It is also hoped that improvements in technology will lead to falls in emissions from the industrial sector, now accounting for 19% of emissions, and that improved insulation, heat pumps etc will reduce emissions from the residential sector – 13% of the 2006 total. Through the adoption of these measures it is believed that the 80% reduction target for 2050 could be achieved at a cost in that year of 1-2% of GDP.

There is an opportunity to achieve significant progress towards the decarbonisation of electricity generation in the first three budget period, up to 2022 as around a third of UK electricity generation capacity – mainly, coal generation capacity – is scheduled to be retired in the next 15 years. And the report urges that this opportunity is grasped, given the almost full decarbonisation of the power sector required by 2030, and the expectation that electricity demand will increase with a growth in electric vehicles and its use for heat production. But this ignores the problem of security of supply. It cannot realistically be expected that any significant part of the shortfall in generation capacity can be made up from wind power alone, so with the delays in starting any new nuclear stations, despite the declared intention to do so, and which the committee believes should be accelerated, shortages of electricity would soon become apparent unless there is an immediate start on new coal and gas-fired stations. Much of the report, is given over to considerations of carbon trading within the EU ETS (energy trading scheme) and with free trade in emissions reductions certificates. But there are concerns that the likely carbon prices in the 2020’s – believed to be around £40/tCO2 in 2020 in a central scenario – may not be sufficiently high so that the UK could be locked into a carbon-intense generating plant, and the report considers measures that might be applied to any new coal plants to avoid this, although later qualifying this view arguing that with estimates of likely carbon prices in the 2020s, conventional coal-fired generation is unlikely to be economic.

Nevertheless they argue that the carbon price lever should be buttressed by a requirement that by 2020 no new coal stations should be built without CCS and those built earlier will be given a deadline for retrofitting CCS. The decision to build however rests finally with the private power companies; given the uncertainties over the development of CCS technology, as recognized by the Committtee itself, and its very high additional costs, they may be unwilling to proceed without assurances of how the extra costs may be covered or what compensation may be given if these stations are to be prematurely shut down or their hours of operation reduced

Finally there is a mention of the problem of fuel poverty. The higher energy prices required to meet carbon budgets will increase the number of fuel poor households. Although not referred to the extra cost for renewable energy certificates will be a major factor in increasing energy prices. The report believes this should be addressed through energy efficiency improvements, income transfers or social tariffs. “Further work is required to understand the most appropriate delivery mechanism.”

Talk or action?

Does the recent plethora of nuclear fora represent a real advance or rather a means of substituting talk for action. We now have a Government sponsored Nuclear Development Forum created not to do anything itself but to advise another Government body – the Office of Nuclear Development whose aims are; to facilitate new nuclear investment in the UK, and to advise the Secretary of State on the exercise of his regulatory and policy functions in relation to the nuclear industry. The Forum itself, meeting three times a year is chaired by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. Membership is from senior representatives from the nuclear industry including vendors, operators, key suppliers, contractors and unions involved in the industry, and Government.

There is also a Franco-British Nuclear Forum which held a first meeting in Paris in November 2007, chaired by the Minister for Energy and the French Industry Minister. Its aim is to develop a European energy policy, focussing on energy security, diversity of supply, sustainability, market competitiveness, global warming and energy efficiency, as well as seeking to stabilise (not reduce?) concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,. There is a reference to working groups on specific topics and for a further follow-up meetings.

Next there is the European Nuclear Energy Forum launcched by the EU commission late in 2007. An inaugural meeting was held in Bratislava in November 2007. A second meeting took place in Prague in May 2008 with participation of the Commission President José Manuel Barroso and the EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs. It was intended to emphasize the Commission's commitment to pursue an open and transparent debate on nuclear energy. On the basis of reports presented by working groups, the debate in Prague concentrated on the priority issues - the competitiveness of nuclear energy in a low carbon energy mix; financing new nuclear build; legal requirements; harmonisation of nuclear safety; progress on waste management; qualified human resources; and gaining public trust. A third meeting was held, again in Bratislava in November 2008. The subjects discussed were again nuclear safety, costs of nuclear electricity, and public acceptance. A new item was the development of new concepts for electrical grids. This meeting was attended by over 200 participants from member state governments, European institutions and major energy companies, as well as those in the field of public administration, industry, finance and civil society. The ENEF plans to continue to meet twice a year.

There could be some confusion in name between the European Nuclear Energy Forum ENEF and Foratom, the European Nuclear Forum. This is the Brussels-based trade association for the nuclear energy industry in Europe. Its membership is made up of 17 national nuclear forums, and also represents some 800 of Europe’s largest companies.