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2008 Nuclear Issues v30 10 |
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Written by Nuclear Issues
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Friday, 21 November 2008 |
Nuclear Issues is also available as a pdf download
A grim future
Despite the recent publication of two authoritative reports, from the Renewable Energy Foundation (Electricity Prices in the UK, May 2008) and Fells Associates (A Pragmatic Energy Policy for the UK, August 2008), there are few signs that the seriousness of future electricity shortages is appreciated by the Government. Yet both reports spell out the same alarming message of electricity shortages from 2012 to 2020, as some coal-fired stations are closed down under the clean air requirements of the EU Directive and as older nuclear stations are withdrawn from service, if new capacity is not built in time. Fells suggests a total of 23GWe (30% of generating capacity) will need to be replaced by 2020. The REF quotes higher figures from EdF and E.ON UK as 32 GWe and 26 GWe respectively, to be replaced by 2015. (30GWe would represent a loss of 37% of present capacity). The Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) is more optimistic maintaining that only 20 GW will be retired by 2020. Since the Government always insists that electricity supply is the responsibility of the industry it would be sensible to assume that the higher figures from EDF and E.ON are more probable. . This leaves a gap which can only be filled by electricity from new coal, gas, renewables, nuclear power, cable connections to the continent, or by reducing demand to match the reduced supply. There are as yet no clear indications as to how, or even if, this gap will be filled.
Nuclear
It seems to be generally accepted that site work for a first new nuclear station in the UK will not begin before 2013, although the actual construction for an established design can take only some five years.
The delay in starting is said to be largely due to the need for the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate II to approve the designs so as to reassure the British public that the stations are safe; the Generic Design Assessment of three nuclear reactor designs is not due to be completed before 2011. But it is only too probable that, to justify their time and effort, the NII will come up with some modifications or alternatives that they believe would offer improvements. Are we then to go back to another one-off British PWR, as with Sizewell B? Will EDF and the other electricity companies be willing to accept changes that would loose the benefits of replication and increase their costs? And if not the nuclear opponents would almost certainly mount a legal challenge leading to further delays. It is then unlikely that a new nuclear station can be commissioned before 2018 and so will not contribute to solving the shortages likely to arise in the years from 2012 onwards.
Under these circumstances the present closure programme, under which 7.4 GWe of nuclear capacity is due to close by 2020, should be re-examined. The limited resources of the Nuclear Inspectorate could be more usefully applied to assessing the safety case for such a life extension than in re-examining designs which are already being built or licensed in Europe and elsewhere. Fells considers that life extension for four of the nuclear stations due to come off-line between 2010 through to 2023 could provide 3 to 4 GWe. The REF is more pessimistic and concludes that the run-down of existing nuclear capacity is imminent and inevitable.
There has indeed been a continuous decline in British Energy's nuclear output since its "reconstruction" from 63.5 TWh in 2000/01 to 50.3 TWh in 2007/08 due to unplanned shutdowns and other loss of output. Is it possible that this decline might be reversed following the takeover of British Energy by the experienced nuclear operator EDF? But there could be an immediate threat to supply. The National Grid has warned of possible power cuts this winter if Hartlepool and Heysham (2.4 GW)e are not brought back into service by the end of this year; BE has now announced that these plants will not be back on line until early 2009. We must hope for a mild winter.
Renewables
The Government places its hopes on a large expansion
of windpower with the target that 10% of electricity will be generated
by renewables by 2010. This is clearly unattainable. Wind now generates
only 1.3% of electricity supply; the greater part of the present 4.9%
of supply from renewable electricity comes from landfill gas and
hydropower, neither of which can be expanded significantly. Nor can
intermittent renewables replace base load. A report for the REF from
James Oswald using Met Office and Ofgem data claims that power swings
of 70% within 12 hours are to be expected in winter. This will require
individual generators to go on or off line frequently, thereby reducing
the utilisation and reliability of large centralised plants. These
reductions will lead to increases in the cost of electricity and
reductions in potential carbon savings.
Worse is to come with
the draft EU plan that 20% of final energy consumption must come from
renewable energy by 2020 with financial penalties on failures to meet
this target. Fells points out that the target which is based on the
final energy consumption implies a well-nigh impossible 40% electricity
to come from renewable sources. The costs of this would be intolerable.
It has been suggested that the politicians signing up to this plan did
not appreciate the difference between energy and electricity.
The
Renewable Energy Foundation in a later paper "Response to the Renewable
Energy Strategy Consultation 2008" of 5th September is particulalry
scathing of the EU draft. It claims that the targets are
1. technically and practically infeasible in the given timeframe;
2. the costs of attempts to meet them will be insupportable;
3. they are counterproductive for climate change policy;
4. fr technical and economic reasons they will compound gas dependency rather than alleviate it;
5. they will create hyperprofit for investors, but suppress innovation, and drive suboptimal renewables development.
According
to Fells the subsidies for renewables last year were £1 bilion and he
claims that if subsidies continue to be provided in the same way the
cost by 2020 could amount to between £20bn to £30bn yearly. The REF
argues that to avoid the EU penalty the Government would need to
subsidise renewables and comes up with a similar figure of £25
billion/year. However it now seems unlikely that this EU draft target
will ever be approved. The Polish Government has pointed out that with
a 90% dependence on coalfired electricity it will be quite impossible
for it to be implemented in Poland.
Future possibilities may lie
in the development of tidal power, but any contribution to electricity
supply would only come after the critical period of 2012-2020. A Severn
barrage might be able to supply up to 5% of electricity demand - but
not within the next 10 years. Despite this delay Fells is enthusiastic
about the longer term prospects for tidal power and the Severn Barrage,
and some 40% of their paper is given over to a section "Time for Tidal
Power, A renewable force for the future."
Gas
The
REF points out that "In recent years natural gas has been cheap and
especially attractive if one discounts the fact that it is a finite
resource. Consequently, since the early 1990s there has been a rapid
growth of low-capital-cost, high efficiency, gas-fired combined cycle
gas turbines (CCGT) in all OECD countries. With the notable exception
of Sizewell B, all new, central, thermal generating plant built in the
UK since the commissioning of Drax 6 in 1982 has been CCGT. Enthusiasts
for gas sincerely believed that its price, based on regional markets,
could be de-linked from other hydrocarbons such as oil and coal and
that as depletion took place, new sources would be found. However, it
is increasingly clear that this is not the case, a fact that is
particularly troubling given current oil price trajectories."
Gas
is getting evermore expensive, and as UK gas production from the North
Sea declines, we will be importing 80% of our gas requirements by 2020
at a time when international competition over supply increases. The REF
claims that in just eight years time we will be looking to import
between 90 and 100 Mtoe of gas; a figure that will rise rapidly as UK
gas continues to decline, and by 2015 the UK could be the greatest
sovereign importer of natural gas in the world but it will then be in
competition with China, Japan, the USA and other European countries for
possibly limited supply - a competition in which we are unlikely to
succeed. If shortages develop priority may have to be given to
domestic, services and industrial users which now consume 2/3rds of UK
gas supply with only 1/3rd going to electricity generation.
There
are no longer any reliable suppliers. If it is confirmed that
Norway's gas production will peak around 2020 Norway may seek to
conserve supplies for its own use; reduce pipeline deliveries and
increase LNG exports which can be sold anywhere for the highest price.
LNG can and will flow to the highest bidder. World LNG import capacity
far exceeds that for production suggesting that this will be a sellers
market. Internal demand in the Middle East countries is also expanding
with growing industrialisation and increasing reliance on water
desalination. Similarly the REF report shows that although Russian gas
production has risen since 1997 internal consumption has increased at
an even faster rate, driving exports down. There are also signs that
Russian production is now falling. The IEA forecasts a decline in
Russian production of 18 Mtoe per year for the foreseable future.
Russia does not supply any gas directly to the UK, but if deliveries to
Germany (over 40% dependent on Russian gas) and other EU countries are
reduced or cut off the UK would also be affected.
The REF is
critical of the manner in which the working of the electricity market
system (BETTA) has encouraged the power industry to continue its
construction of low-cost CCGTs at a time when it should have been
perfectly obvious that North Sea gas was depleting and that these
generators would have to be energized by possibly insecure supplies of
imported gas. The UK policy of maximizing gas output from the North Sea
from 1985 to 2000 when prices were low was a major factor in the "dash
for gas" which pushed electricity prices down to a point where British
Energy could not compete and was driven to 'reconstruction'. This early
over-production was a major factor in keeping gas prices low, and
unlike Norway, the other North Sea operator, the UK spent the income
received and has not built up a sovereign wealth fund.
The REF
concludes "that even if gas generating capacity is built ahead of UK
plant closures there is a quantifiable risk that these installations
will be commissioned just as a world gas-supply crunch results in high
and volatile prices and may even leave large parts of the market
physically unsupplied." Despite this pessimistic assessment the default
position is to build new gas-fired stations as they can be completed in
four years, but as yet only 4.5GWe are under construction. Increasing
gas generation will also derail attempts to reduce CO2 emissions, which
will continue to rise.
Coal
Over 80% of coal
burnt in the UK is for the generation of electricity, to provide about
34% of total supply. As domestic production of coal has declined over
70% of our coal is now imported; but coal is readily available on world
markets where Australia, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa are the
major exporters. Although the price of coal has risen sharply in the
last years following the price of oil an increase in coal plant would
be an obvious choice to fill the generation gap. But an increased
reliance on coal generation will conflict directly with the requirement
to reduce carbon emissions. This is the dilemma now facing the
Government; security of electricity supply is in direct conflict with
the commitment to reduce carbon emissions; one or the other must be
abandoned.
This drives the protest against proposals for a new
coal plant at Kingsnorth, protests that will no doubt be repeated at
all other proposed new coal sites. Yet for the Government there is
really no choice. As the previous Secretary of State for Business, John
Hutton put it "No coal plus no nuclear equals no lights". The economic
and social collapse that would arise from shortages of electricity are
imminent, within the next five years, and here at home; the effects of
climate change are more remote, long term, and global. And as Fells
points out coal-fired stations can be upgraded by conversion to
supercritical steam operation when new stations will operate with 46%
efficiency compared with the present 35% Integrated gasification
combined cycle (IGCC) coal stations are even more efficient at over
50%. Another way of bridging the energy gap would be to keep the
optedout coal-fired stations operating past 2015, in spite of EU
emissions regulation. Although this would damage the UK's "Clean"
image, Fells believes it may be unavoidable. Once built however any new
coal stations would add to carbon emissions for the next 30 or more
years. Proposals for safe carbon dioxide storage may be little more
than wishful thinking. The new Secretary of State for Energy and
Climate Change will be pulled in opposite directions by his conflicting
responsibilities.
Cable connections
Amongst the
measures proposed in both the Fells and REF reports to ease the
anticipated shortfall of electricity generation is an increase in the
import of electricity through additional cable connections to other
European countries. These could be built within two or three years
using British technology. A link to the Netherlands, the 1 GWe BritNed
cable, is already underway.
The value of such connections is
plain. In 2007 electricity imports were 8 613 GWh (just over 2% of
total supply) of mainly nuclear electricity from France. In comparison
the total windpower generation for 2007 was only 5,274 GWh, produced at
a far higher cost with support through the Renewables Obligation and
providing an unpredictable and intermittent supply. At full capacity
the French cable could bring in 17 TWh
The possibility of
connections to countries such as Norway and Sweden and further
connections to France, all countries where the electricity from hydro
or nuclear power is carbon free, should be urgently explored. Even a
link with Iceland should be considered. It is a country with large
potential hydro power resources and the possibility of a cable
connection to the UK was proposed some 20 years ago. A possible joint
collaboration in developing new hydro schemes might contribute to
resolving the financial problems which have now arisen between our two
countries with the failure of the Icelandic banks. A country with large
undeveloped hydro resources cannot be considered bankrupt.
Such
connections to other European countries could even go some way to
supporting some expansion of wind power in the UK which the Government
seems determined to pursue. A BBC programme of 4th September referred
to the experience from Denmark which showed that the windpower
production of some 20% of total generation could only be sustained by
exporting the surplus, generated at times of high wind but low demand,
to the neighbouring countries. The actual consumption of wind
electricity within Denmark is only about 8.5% of the total generation.
But there is a snag; such exports, often made at times of low demand in
the recipient countries, can only command low or very low prices. The
extra costs this incurs, borne by the Danish taxpayers, have been
estimated at several hundred million DKr/year. (NI February 2006)
Energy efficiency
In
the 2007 Energy White Paper the Government insists that "the starting
point for our energy policy is to save energy" and assumes that
improving energy efficiency can reduce energy demand. Yet this is
contrary to experience, and the REF September report quotes Jevons'
famous postulate of 1865 that it is wholly a confusion of ideas to
suppose that the economical use of fuels is equivalent to a diminished
consumption. The very contrary is the truth. This is the basis for the
so-called rebound effect where the benefits of increased efficiency of
use are taken to increase in consumption or spent on other energy uses.
The REF shows UK energy consumption has increased by some 20% between
1982 and 2005, and reproduces graphs for the UK, USA and Japan showing
energy consumption rising as the intensity of energy use falls. (A
reduction in energy intensity is equivalent to an improvement in energy
efficiency, as this means less energy is used to generate a unit of
GDP.) The REF suggests that this is a consequence of improved energy
efficiency which makes the use of energy less expensive, encouraging
increased use, (the rebound effect). There is also an effect from the
changing structure of the economy, with a decline in the energy
intensive industrial sector and a rise in the contribution to GDP from
the low energy services and financial sectors.
A third factor
now coming into prominence with the return to fashion of Keynesian
economics is the multiplier effect of injecting capital into the
economy to boost economic growth. The Keynesian multiplier will also
influence energy consumption so that expenditure to increase the
efficiency of energy use, while always desirable, will at the same time
increase, not reduce energy consumption. An example is the latest
Government scheme for home insulation at a cost of nearly £1000
million. This will lead to the insulation manufacturers doing more
business and paying out more to their shareholders who will buy more
goods and services. The insulator installers will take on more staff
who will spend more wages on food, clothes, etc. The shopkeepers
selling these goods will then earn greater profits which they in turn
will spend, and .. so on and ...so on, like ripples spreading through a
pond. The whole economy will grow and with it the consumption of
energy. This of course is the whole point of "spending out of
recession", but it will not, as the Government seems to believe, reduce
energy use, but increase it.
Go ahead for PBMR
After
a good deal of discussion the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is to
be built in South Africa. The small 165 MWe demonstration plant will be
built alongside the existing Koberg site of South Africa’s existing
nuclear power plant equipped with two 900 MWe French designed
pressurized water reactors.
The contract which has just been
signed calls for a start of construction in 2010 with completion set
for September 2014. If successful the plan is to built up to 30 of
these plants sized about 300 MWe in South Africa.
South Africa
first showed interest in the pebble bed reactor back in 1993 and the
utility Eskom formed the PMBR company in 1999. The world nuclear
community has watched the South African work with keen interest having
previously completed a great deal of development work on the high
temperature gas-cooled reactor concepts. It is a natural progression
from the advanced gas-cooled reactor and was nearly built at Oldbury B
but abandoned when the then Central Electricity Generating Board got
frightened by high temperatures. The Germans also undertook a large
development of the pebble bed concept eventually building a 300 MWe
demonstration plant but the crazy political system in that country
finally scrapped the system and pulled the reactor down.
The
PMBR is largely constructed in graphite, a ceramic material that can
withstand very high temperatures which account for the claim of great
safety. The reactor can virtually be left to look after itself if
anything goes amiss and it will not reach a temperature at which any of
the fuel will fail.
When we first saw the pebble bed concept in
the Christmas edition of a leading magazine we thought it was a joke. A
reactor core formed from a pile of ball shaped elements. But a small
experimental reactor was built in Germany and operated safely at 15 MWe
and temperatures up to 950 °C for many years.
The fuel in fact
consists of uranium enriched to about 10% - somewhat higher than the 4%
to 5% of a light water reactor giving it the potential for high burnup.
It is contained in small pellets coated in silicon carbide which makes
it very secure. The pellets are imbedded in a sphere of graphite about
6 cm in diameter - nearly the size of a tennis ball. Each pebble
contains about 9 grm of uranium and a full core of around 450 000
pebbles makes a load of about 4.1 te. Fuel pebbles are continuously
added at the top and removed from the bottom. The reactivity of the
pebbles is measured at the bottom and if sufficient it is recycled to
the top. But when after about six passes through the core the fuel is
used up it is diverted to spent fuel storage vaults below the reactor.
There are ten of these each with a capacity 600 000 pebbles which means
that they can hold the lifetime fuel of the reactor. At the moment the
intention is to store the used fuel for eventual disposal.
The
reactor is contained in a graphite structure inside a steel pressure
vessel - 88 ft tall and 20 ft diameter. High pressure helium gas
coolant enters at the top at some 500 °C and exits at the bottom at
temperatures up to 950 °C. (We are not quite sure why this figure but
it is always quoted) At this temperature the very hot gas can drive a
turbine to generate electricity. It can also be used for a range of
process heat applications which is another reason for the keen interest
in the system.
The reactor is controlled by rods inserted into
the graphite surrounding the core but the Germans have demonstrated
that in larger reactors rods could be inserted directly into the core
of pebbles.
It has to be said that the main difficulty can be
expected by the system for handling the very high temperature gas but
the South Africans have undertaken a large programme of development and
can be expected to succeed. Countries that should have been in there
helping them included Britain for a while but we sold that opportunity
to the Japanese when we got rid of British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL).
Who is in charge?
The
answer seems to be no one. The Government insists that electricity
supply is entirely a matter for the industry. Yet this is plainly not
the case. The Government through the negative power of veto can, by
refusing planning permission, ensure that only those projects of which
it approves can go ahead. In addition the imposition of the Renewables
Obligation compels the generating companies to build the specified
renewable energy capacity, whether or not they consider this to be a
sensible investment, or else pay the buy out penalty. The generating
companies are thus inhibited in the way they can plan for the future.
And competing with each other under the rules imposed by Ofgem the
emphasis is on the lowest short-term costs. The National Grid is now a
private company operating in the USA as well as the UK and no longer
has any responsibility for seeing that generating margins are
maintained. This free-for-all is a recipe for disaster.
The only consolation is that if we can struggle through the next ten years our nuclear future should be assured.
What about the waste?
The
European Environment Agency put the total electricity generation in the
EU for 2004 as some 300 TWh, of which nuclear provided 31%, coal and
lignite 29.5%, and gas 19.9%. According to the EU Nuclear Illustrative
Programme report of 10.1.2007 the nuclear share of electricity
generation produces some 40 000 m3 of radioactive waste each year. The
greater part of this radioactive waste originates from day-today
activities at the power stations and other nuclear installations, and
is classified as low-level and shortlived. Most of this is disposed of
in surface or nearsurface facilities.
High level and long-life
wastes, mostly as spent nuclear fuel amount to only some 500 m3 per
year, in the form of either irradiated fuel or vitrified waste from
reprocessing. This is something around 1000 tonnes a year depending on
how it is processed. For the high-level and long-lived waste deep
disposal in a stable rock formation is the preferred option by nuclear
operators although near-surface storage in order to make surveillance
and potential recovery easier in the future, if required, could be an
alternative. Since spent nuclear fuel still contains over 95% of
uranium as well as plutonium and other actinides it can be expected
that these will be recovered and used to extend uranium resources and
as fuel for future advanced and fast reactors. Mixed plutonium/ uranium
oxide fuel is already being used in increasing quantities in present
reactors. The amount of waste for final disposal will then be
considerably less than the 1000 tonnes/year, perhaps no more than a few
hundred tonnes a year for the whole of the EU. Nuclear waste disposal
is however seen by the public as a major obstacle to nuclear power. The
2005 Eurobarometer survey showed that the EU public is not well
informed on nuclear issues, including possible benefits in terms of
mitigating climate change, and the risks associated with the different
levels of radioactive waste. It also found that out of a majority of
citizens having questions about nuclear, 40% of those opposed to
nuclear energy would change their mind if solutions to nuclear waste
issues were found.
In contrast to the minimal quantities of
radioactive waste, the coal power stations, generating some 1000 TWh,
only a slightly smaller share of EU than the nuclear stations, would,
assuming carbon emissions of 800 gm/kWh, discharge about 800 million
tonnes/ year of carbon dioxide generation. But to meet concerns over
climate change it is being proposed that some part of this carbon
dioxide should be separated from the flue gases and buried underground.
The nuclear waste is in solid form as a ceramic or as vitrified waste,
both of which are resistant to water erosion, as well as being encased
in metal containers. The possibility that buried underground any
radioactive matter would ever return to the surface is remote. After a
few hundred years most of the radioactivity would decay to levels that
are common in our surrounding environment. Carbon dioxide does not
decay and would have to be stored for ever – an impossible
requirement given that under pressure it would probably be as liquid
which, with any water intrusion, would give a slightly acid solution
that would, over time, attack the surrounding rock and eventually find
its way to the surface. When released it would, heavier than air,
blanket the surroundings and smother all life.
If the public has
doubts over the safe storage of less than one thousand tonnes a year of
nuclear waste will they ever be likely to accept the underground
disposal of several million times more carbon dioxide which if released
could causes an immediate, not a longterm danger.
Carbon capture and sequestration
With
the expectation that oil and gas supplies will become evermore
expensive as available supply decreases while world demand for
electricity continues to grow, there will be an increase in the need
for coal-fired electricity generation. In March last year, with the
expectation that the share of fossilfired generation will increase, the
European Council announced that all new power plant should be fitted
with carbon capture and storage CCS by 2020. It also endorsed the
construction and operation of up to 12 commercial-scale demonstration
plants in the EU by 2015. Carbon separation and storage is seen as the
only means of meeting the requirement to reduce carbon emissions.
To
meet this situation the Environment Agency has now issued a Position
Paper on CCS, capturing the carbon before or after combustion and
storing it underground. It claims that CCS is technologically feasible,
and that a fully integrated demonstration plant could be built using
existing technologies that are economic under certain conditions. This
might apply to the capture process, although the presence of sulphur
and nitrogen oxides might be a complication and restrict the process to
only certain coals, but it does not address the storage problem. It
also points out that CCS can only be used at the large point sources
– which in the UK are responsible for 35 per cent emissions. Any new
coal stations built before CCS is an established solution – by 2020?
- will also tie us into a high emissions path over the lifetime of the
plant of about 30 years – unless these plants are designed so that
CCS can be retrofitted, and it is suggested that the Government should
use its powers under the Electricity Act to ensure that this is done.
Whether this condition would be accepted by the private power companies
remains to be seen. With the imperative to ensure an adequate supply of
electricity the Government is not in a strong position.
It is
possible that carbon capture could be technically feasible, but the
main problem will be in finding sites which can contain the vast
quantities of carbon dioxide to be stored securely and for ever. The
Environment Agency suggests sites could be found in depleted oil and
gas fields, coal seams or deep saline aquifers. But there will be
widespread, and justified, opposition to any sites on land which would
rule out depleted coal seams. It has been suggested that carbon dioxide
could be injected into the depleting North Sea oil and gas fields to
increase the recovery. Carbon dioxide is indeed a powerful solvent and
its injection into depleting oil fields is used to increase recovery,
but in this case the carbon dioxide will return to the surface with the
recovered oil. Storage in saline aquifers would come up against the
problems of acidification.
In the face of these problems the
Agency asserts that the regulatory framework must reliably safeguard
the capture, transport and storage of CO2 to reduce the risks of slow
or catastrophic leakage to the local environment; that storage sites
must be carefully chosen and managed to ensure their environmental
integrity over hundreds of years (or rather for ever), and it admits
that many of the sites currently identified for potential future
storage may not, therefore, be suitable. On the other hand it suggests
that largescale projects using the Sleipner aquifer in the North Sea
and the Weyburn oilfield in Canada show that it is possible to store
CO2 safely and monitor its movement reliably, but this experience is
for only a few years of storage, longer term effects cannot be known in
advance.
There is the additional problem of carrying the carbon
dioxide from the power stations to the storage site. This can only be
though a network of CO2 pipelines, themselves a potential source of
leakage and extremely costly, although the Agency suggests that the
Government should work out a framework for funding and building them,
with further work to map the suitability of prospective storage sites.
But with the risk of "lock-in" to high emissions pathways from new coal
plants it is suggested that they should be built as close as possible
to a suitable storage site. But finding an acceptable storage site may
take years, time we cannot afford to meet the coming electricity supply
crisis.
Public concern over the far smaller and potentially less
hazardous disposal of nuclear waste suggests that this will be the
major problem with finding acceptable CO2 storage sites. The Agency
then urges that as soon as possible the Government must provide clarity
over the regulatory framework to reduce developer uncertainty and
improve public confidence; the regulatory responsibilities of different
Government departments, devolved administrations and agencies,
(particularly where CCS activities extend offshore), will need to be
clearly defined: rigorous criteria for site selection is a priority,
and research is needed to understand the potential environmental and
safety risks of transport and storage. These risks the Agency suggests
include the problems of low levels of CO2 exposure on surrounding
ecosystems. This seems a gross understatement; the concern is not over
low levels of exposure on ecosystems but on the potential threat to all
life forms of a massive escape. If a significant leak were to happen
the whole concept would probably be abandoned.
Carbon capture
and storage may prove to be only a comforting illusion to justify the
prompt construction of the new coal plants that will be required to
avoid the more damaging shortage of electricity that will otherwise
occur.
India
At its second meeting on the topic, at the
beginning of September the Nuclear Supply Group finally, and with some
reluctance, agreed to accept the India-USA nuclear trade agreement.
Among the countries which are reported to have delivered statements to
clarify their views on how the NSG's policy on India should be
implemented were: Austria, China, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. They urged that India
should accept a nuclear test moratorium pledge and take further
non-proliferation and disarmament measures, including "entry into force
of the CTBT and a termination of fissile material production for
weapons." But these statements are only expression of opinion and are
not included in the final text of the agreement. Other objections,
mainly from US critics describe the Agreement as "a non-proliferation
disaster of historic proportions that will produce harm for decades to
come." They draw attention to the fact that unlike 179 other countries,
India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; it continues to
produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. And they claim
that India's political promises on non-proliferation and a voluntary
test moratorium are not in any way equivalent to the legal obligations
and commitments made by the member states. These objections however
carried no weight and after approval of the US Senate the Bill was
signed by President Bush on 8th October.
On the other hand in
the light of the large expansion of nuclear capacity in many coutries
with forecasts from the IEA and IAEA that world capacity could double
by 2030 it can be expcted that, as a large rapidly expanding economy,
India will seek a significant share of this expansion. The US then
expects that the agreement will open a large and lucrative market for
their own nuclear industry, and the other major potential supply
countries of fuel and equipment will also seek a share. But as the
critics point out although nuclear fuel sales to India for Indian power
reactors will help increase India’s energy output, it will at the
same time free-up India’s limited domestic uranium supplies to be
used for bomb-making.
The nuclear trade need not however be a
one-way exchange. Specialised Indian companies can expect to take a
share of the international market in nuclear equipment , notably
pressure vessels, heat exchangers and other heavy components which
might otherwise be a limitation on the rate of expansion of the world
nuclear power capacity .
Although the India-USA agreement is a
clear divergence from the existing non-proliferaion regime it is a
pragmatic acceptance of India as a nuclear weapon state. It suggests
that the non-proliferation treaty has now ceased to serve its purpose.
Why should any of the non-weapon states continue to accept the
restrictions of the NPT when they see that these are not applied to
India - a clear nuclear proliferator. It now appears that the main
restraint on nuclear hostilites has been the MAD principle of mutual
assured destruction rather than the NPT. Most weapon states are locked
into specific, counterbalancing targets Russia/USA; India/ Pakistan;
and China/USA or even China/Russia.
Israel is a worrying
unconstrained exception in that its missiles threaten the Arab world
which is unable to offer any nuclear retaliation. France and the UK,
without having any obvious potential targets to aim at, are what might
be seen as in a state of national psychosis, driven by a free-floating
anxiety – or more probably by the prestige and military might they
believe that possession of a nuclear deterrent confers.
Is an
update of the Trident missile and its submarine delivery system in the
UK said to cost up to £20 billion or £50 billion over its operating
lifetime a wise and rational policy at this time of financial crisis.
The more pressing and urgent need is for a secure energy and
electricity supply; without this all military pretensions will collapse.
Nuclear regulators
An
important element in convincing the public that spent nuclear fuel is
being safely handled and stored must be confidence that the nuclear
regulators are carrying out their role free from government
interference. Independence of the regulators is a key issue, but also
the EU regulators have to be working within the same framework.
The
member states of the EU are already signed up to basic rules in these
areas, and the national regulators are committed to a full exchange of
information. At their most recent meeting the regulators made an
important decision. By unanimous agreement they decided that it should
be mandatory that IAEA peer review teams should thoroughly review
systems in each regulatory body. This, however, will take some time to
complete, so it was also agreed that member states would make
selfassessments against IAEA standards, with the assistance of experts
from other member states. The co-operative work of the national
regulators is brought together in the European High Level Group on
nuclear safety, waste management and decommissioning.
The next
move by the HLG is to begin discussions on the establishment and
implementation of radioactive waste management plans in all member
states. The regulators are also increasing the transparency of their
work by creating a website at EU level, which will make relevant data
open to the general public.
All these are important steps in
reassuring the general public that safety issues are being given the
highest priority by the industry, and also to give the lie to those
opponents of nuclear power who are forever claiming that "there is no
solution to the problem of waste management". There are none so blind
as those who will not see.
EdF and British Energy
The furore over the failed takeover may be exaggerated.
The
question is whether or not British Energy is worth more than £12
billion. Invesco and Pru, both financial organisations who think it is,
know little about nuclear technology but look primarily at the present
and probable future price of electricity. (are they being greedy?) EdF
with its vast experience of operating nuclear power stations should be
better able to assess the value of the aging Advanced Gascooled Reactor
stations and is unwilling to pay more.
A look at BE's results
over recent years suggests that EdF will be proved right. Since the
reconstruction there has been an almost continuous, and accelerating
decline in the nuclear output. How far and how fast will this decline
continue?
00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08
TWh 63.5 67.6 63.8 65.0 59.8 60.4 51.2 50.3
The
performance of the AGRs is even worse than these figures show. The
total nuclear output is boosted by the good performance over these
years of Sizewell B.
It is also interesting that under the
previous management, (much abused by Patricia Hewitt), before the
reconstruction, BE's nuclear output was steadily increasing. The
turnaround and progressive decline under the new management is striking.
95 96 97 98 99
TWh 55.1 61.2 67.2 66.7 69.1
The
AGRs seem to be suffering from specific aging problems - corrosion etc
- which can be remedied at a cost. But lurking in the background is a
potential generic fault with the graphite moderator.
Some years
ago there were reports on the monitoring of graphite samples, but we
have not seen anything on this recently. EdF would, we assume, have
contact with Dr Pascal Colombani, a French nuclear physicist and board
member of BE who is also a director of Alsthom. Perhaps they know
something we do not.
EDF might do better in seeking
accommodation at Magnox sites, where the Government could lean on the
NDA - if indeed the NDA still owns these sites. Or are they now under
the control of Energy Solutions Inc who a few years ago advertised
their opposition to nuclear power and their expertise in shutting down
and cleaning up nuclear facilities? Is there any reason why a replica
of Flammanville cannot be built on the Dungeness A site, which is only
a few miles across the Channel, without the need for a long public
inquiry or lengthy approval by the Nuclear Inspectorate. There could be
large savings with both sites under the control of EdF. And the plant
could come into operation by 2015. |
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Last Updated ( Monday, 24 November 2008 )
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